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Recurrence of past major accidents, injuries and fatalities are often reported in process 
industries which resulted in significant losses in terms of lives and property. Although 
proper incident investigation has been performed to identify the causes of an accident, 
but the failure to perform investigation thoroughly by identifying the root cause of an 
incident causes lack of relevant investigation findings and gives opportunity for 
incident to reoccur. The objective of this project is to develop an incident 
investigation root cause analysis model, Tripod Beta, to help industries investigation 
team to thoroughly investigate and identify the root cause of an incident thus 
confirming the necessity of a root cause analysis in performing incident investigation. 
The scope of this project involves development of the incident investigation system 
framework based on OSHA PSM, perform case study based on process plant 
investigation report in order to develop the root cause model, and establishing a data 
storing and sharing system for better communication of incident inside organization. 
The result of the constructed tripod beta model will help confirming the necessity of a 
root cause model, which is a powerful tool in order to identify the root cause of an 
incident, thus giving industry a more reliable preventive action measure to avoid 
accident recurrence. This will result in cost saving in terms of reduce compensation 
claim and property losses from an accident. and also serves as a reference precaution 













First and foremost I would like to praise and thank Allah S.W.T for the strength, 
patience, guidance and opportunity that has been provided to me throughout my Final 
Year Project. 
I would like to express my utmost gratitude and appreciation to my final year project I 
& II supervisor, Prof. Dr. Azmi Mohd Shariff, for being very helpful, giving me the 
opportunity to handle this project and also the guidance and advise he provided me 
throughout the time frame of finishing the project. His guidance truly has set my limit 
of experience to another level. My many thanks to Mrs. Noor Diana Abd Majid, Post 
Graduate student, who had help me throughout this project, giving me countless 
knowledge, guidance and encourage me to be independent in doing my own project. 
Thank you for helping me in successfully completing my final year project.  
Very special thanks to my beloved mother and father, who has fully supported in 
physically and emotionally, directly or indirectly towards the success of my work. To 
all the rest of my family members and my devoted friends, you are truly one of a kind. 

















LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................v 
LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................................vi 
 
CHAPTER 1.............................................................................................................. 1 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background of Study ........................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Significant of Project ........................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Objective of Research Study ................................................................................ 4 
1.5 Scope of Study ..................................................................................................... 4 
1.6 Relevancy of Project ............................................................................................ 4 
1.7 Feasibility of Project ............................................................................................ 5 
 
CHAPTER 2.............................................................................................................. 6 





CHAPTER 3............................................................................................................ 16 
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................. 16 
3.1 Research Methodology ...................................................................................... 16 
3.2 Gantt Chart and Milestones....................................................................................19 
3.3 Tools.......................................................................................................................20 
3.4 Project Schedule.....................................................................................................21 
 
CHAPTER 4............................................................................................................ 22 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................ 22 
 
CHAPTER 5............................................................................................................ 29 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................................ 30 
 
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................30 












LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Core Diagram Element ............................................................................. 11 
Figure 2: Event occurred through combination "and" of hazard & object ................. 12 
Figure 3: Event constructed based on two hazards and object .................................. 28 
Figure 4: Damage and injury resulting from a fire incident. Prior, main and 
subsequent event sequence...........................................................................................13 
Figure 5: Failed control and defense contributes to event............................................14 
Figure 6: Tripod causation model................................................................................15     
Figure 7: Framework of OSHA PSM Incident Investigation System..........................17 
Figure 8: Flowchart of carrying out root cause analysis using Tripod Beta................18   
Figure 9: HOE Prime Event Diagram.........................................................................23 
Figure 10: Subsequent event from Piston Hub event.................................................24 
Figure 11: Subsequent event from Material Failed event...........................................25 
Figure 12: Tripod Beta diagram of Compressor K-31201A Failure...........................26 
Figure 13:  Incident Investigation System Files...........................................................26   
Figure 14: Checklist of Incident Investigation.............................................................27 
 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: OSHA PSM Elements .................................................................................. 2 
Table 2: Gantt chart for Final Year Project I ............................................................ 19 
Table 3: Milestones of the Final Year Project I ........................................................ 19 
Table 4: Gantt chart for Final Year Project II. .......................................................... 20 
Table 5: Milestones of the Final Year Project II. ...................................................... 20 
Table 6: Project schedule for Final Year Project I .................................................... 21 









1.1 Background of Study 
 Unexpected release of flammable, reactive, or toxic liquids and gases in 
process industries involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for many 
years. As the scale of process industries continues to grow to meet the demand of 
customer, the risk of accident in a process plant also increases. Incident continues to 
occur in process industries that uses toxic, flammable, reactive, or explosive, or 
combination of all these properties (Spellman, 1996). Whenever industry uses these 
highly hazardous chemicals, there is always potential for an accidental release any 
time when it is not monitored or controlled properly. As a result, the possibility of 
disaster to occur is imminent.  
 History have recorded a few major disaster such as Bhopal, India (1984), 
which had taken thousands of innocent lives working in a Union Carbide plant due to 
inhaling poisonous gas. Other major disaster includes Phillips Petroleum Company, 
Pasadena, Texas (October 1989), resulting 23 deaths and 132 injuries; Union 
Carbide's Institute, West Virginia (August 1985), injured at least 135 people (OSHA, 
1994). 
 Hazardous chemical release continue to pose a major threat to employees and 
provide impetus, internationally and nationally, for authorities to develop or consider 
developing legislation and regulations to eliminate or minimize the potential for such 
event. Promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
under section 29 1910.119 of the Federal Code of Regulations (CFR), Process Safety 
Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals was put into effect in February 
1992 to protect workers from injury and accident due to the release of this highly 
hazardous chemicals (USEPA, 1996). 
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 The purpose of this standard is to prevent the occurrence of, or minimize the 
consequences of catastrophic releases by stating the policies and procedures for the 
management of process hazards in design, construction, start-up, operation, 
inspection, maintenance and the other matters addressed in the OSHA standard 
(Moran, 1996). OSHA PSM 29 CFR 1910.119 is a regulatory standard comprises of 
14 elements which is shown in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: OSHA PSM Elements 
OSHA PSM REGULATION ELEMENTS 
29 CFR 1910.119 
Process Safety Information 




Pre-Startup Safety Review 
Mechanical Integrity 
Management of Change 
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Emergency Planning and Response 
Employee Participation 





 An accident is an unfortunate incident (event), such as a forklift truck hit a 
worker, which has resulted in actual injury or illness and/or damage (loss) to assets, 
the environment or third party. An incident is an unplanned event or chain of events, 
which has or could have caused injury or illness and/or damage (loss) to assets, the 
environment or third party (Muhamed Jamil Khan, Syed Razif, 2009). Incidents 
include work-related injuries, occupational illnesses, property damage, spills, fires or 
near miss events that could have resulted in any of these. Known problems should not 
be allowed to persist. A failure to investigate and fix the root cause allows the 
opportunity for the problem to reappear, or for that problem to lead to an accident. 
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Organizations should focus on preventing accidents, not just reporting problems, and 
this requires root cause analysis (Earnest, 1997). Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a data 
(facts) driven incident investigation tool to find out the failure mechanism, 
contributory as well as underlying causes for the incident (Muhamed Jamil Khan, 
Syed Razif, 2009) . 
 This study will focus on the development of incident investigation root cause 
analysis Beta Tripod model following the OSHA PSM standard 29 CFR 1910.119(m) 
- Incident Investigation. Reading of the past major accident occurred in process 
industries, understanding the current OSHA PSM standard on incident investigation, 
integrate it with the Beta Tripod model, and analysis on the incident investigation root 
cause model has been done to better understand the topic of study in order to develop 
the incident investigation model. Next, a framework of the root cause analysis model 
based on the standards under 29 CFR 1910.119(m) - Incident Investigation will be 
established that is in compliance with the PSM regulation. Followed by that, a 
conceptual root cause analysis Beta Tripod model will be developed which uses 
investigation facts to describe the hazard management aspects of the incident using a 
tree diagram. Case study will be conducted using industrial data to validate the 
effectiveness of the conceptual model. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Failure to perform investigation thoroughly by using root cause analysis to 
identify the root cause of an incident contribute to the lack of relevant incident 
investigation findings and give rise to the opportunity for the incident to reoccur. 
Organization should focus on preventing incidents through critically analyze the root 
cause (underlying causes) of an incident and identifying the core elements of incident 





1.3 Significant of Project 
 This project is significant in that it provides incident investigation teams 
method to effectively identify and confirming the relevance of  the data (facts) 
gathering of an incident investigation, thus pointing to the identification of the root 
cause (latent & active failures). The result of this analysis should be a deeper and 
more comprehensive incident investigation and a clearer understanding of the failures 
that needs to be addressed in order to make significant and lasting improvements in 
preventing similar accidents.  
 
1.4 Objective of Research Study 
 The objective of this project is to develop an incident investigation root cause 
analysis model, Tripod Beta, to help industries investigation team to thoroughly 
investigate and identify the root cause of an incident thus confirming the necessity of 
a root cause analysis in performing incident investigation. 
 
1.5 Scope of Study 
 The scope of this project is doing research and literature review on OSHA 
Process Safety Management (PSM) incident investigation and incident investigation 
root cause analysis. Next, a framework on the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) model 
which is the Tripod Beta will be established that is in compliance with the PSM 
incident investigation regulation. After that, a Tripod Beta tree diagram will be 
constructed according to the framework to identify the root cause of an accident, and 
finally a case study will be conducted based on real plant data in order to validate the 
effectiveness of the model. 
 
1.6 Relevancy of Project 
 Incident continues to occur even though process industries have adopted 
proper safety management system established by OSHA. This project will focus on 
identifying the root cause of an incident in order to eliminate the possibility of 
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recurrence of past incident. Once causes of incidents has been identified, organization 
can find a way to correct the failure barrier of the existing process design, and break 
the sequence of events which may lead to the incident, thus eliminate the possibility 
of the incident recurrence. 
 
1.7 Feasibility of Project 
 This project will be done in two semesters which basically includes three basic 
areas, which are research on literature, model development and also case study for 
conceptual model verification at a selected process industries. The Tripod Beta model 
will uses a tree diagram to explain the cause-effect logic of the incident event. 
Microsoft Office tools (Microsoft Excel) will be used for data storing and generating 
the Beta Tripod tree diagram. Once the tree diagram is constructed, case study will be 
conducted to see the effectiveness of the model. Based on the description above, it is 






















 In recent years, chemical accidents that involved the release of toxic 
substances have claimed the lives of hundreds of employees and thousands of other 
worldwide (Spellman, 1996). Recent major disasters include the 1984 Bhopal, India, 
incident resulting in more than 2,000 deaths; Flixborough (1974), chemical plant 
explosion that killed 28 people and seriously injured 36; Seveso (1976); the October 
1989 Phillips Petroleum Company, Pasadena, Texas, incident resulting in 23 deaths 
and 132 injuries; the July 1990 BASF, Cincinnati, Ohio, incident resulting in 2 deaths, 
and the May 1991 IMC, Sterlington, Los Angeles, incident resulting in 8 deaths and 
128 injuries (OSHA, 1994). In order to prevent repeat occurrences of catastrophic 
chemical incident, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and 
the United State Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) have joined forces to 
bring about the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard (PSM) and the USEPA 
Risk Management Program (RMP) (USEPA, 1996). Preventing accidental releases of 
hazardous chemicals is the shared responsibility of industry, government, and the 
public. The first step toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and 
assessing the risks. Once information about chemicals, accidents and hazards are 
openly shared, industry, government, and the community can work together toward 
reducing the risk to public health and the environment (AIChE, 2007). The American 
Institute of Chemical Engineer (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 
defines PSM as a management system focused on prevention of, preparedness for, 
mitigation of, response to, and restoration from catastrophic releases of chemicals or 
energy from a process associated with a facility (AIChE, 2007). Promulgated by 
OSHA under section 29 1910.119 of the Federal Code of Regulations (CFR), PSM 
has been in effect since February 1992. PSM was put into effect to protect workers 
from injury from accidents due to the release of highly hazardous chemicals 
(Spellman, 1997). The purpose of this standard is to prevent the occurrence of, or 
minimize the consequences of, catastrophic releases by stating the policies and 
procedures for the management of process hazards in design, construction, start-up, 
operation, inspection, maintenance and the other matters addressed in the OSHA 
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standard (Moran, 1996). PSM require that all responsible parties survey their 
industrial complexes where covered chemical processes to determine if any of the 137 
Highly Hazardous Chemicals listed in OSHA's Process Safety Management Standard 
(Appendix A) are stored, handled,  used or produced on site (Moran, 1996). The 
OSHA PSM standard contains 14 elements including employee participation (EP), 
process safety information (PSI), process hazards analysis (PHA), operating 
procedures (OP), training, contractors, pre-startup safety review (PSSR), mechanical 
integrity (MI), hot work permit (HWP), management of change (MOC), incident 
investigation (II), emergency planning and response (EPR), compliance audits and 
trade secrets (Spellman, 1997). 
 This project will focused on the element CFR 1910.119 (m) - Incident 
Investigation. Incident Investigation is the process of identifying the underlying 
causes of incidents and implementing steps to prevent similar events from occurring 
(Moran, 1996). Accident is defined as an undesired event that results in harm to 
people, damage to property or loss to process. Incident is defined as an undesired 
event that, under slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in harm to 
people, damage to property or loss to process (Bird, 1992). The intent of an incident 
investigation is for employers to learn from past experiences and thus avoid repeating 
past mistakes. PSM requires the investigation of each incident that resulted in, or 
could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release of a highly hazardous 
chemical in the workplace. These events are sometimes referred to as "near misses", 
meaning that a serious consequence did not occur, but could have occur (OSHA, 
2000).  
 Welborn & Boraiko define an incident investigation as "a reactive procedure 
performed after an incident occurs" (Welborn, 2009). More effective safety programs 
utilize both reactive and proactive methods when investigating incidents. The reactive 
approach to incident investigations most often focuses on the corrective actions after 
an incident occurs. Whereas, the proactive approach aims to prevent incidents from 
happening in the first place (Earnest, 1997). Organizations conduct incident 
investigations in order to eliminate the probability that the given type of incident will 
reoccur. To ensure this, "information obtained during the investigation about the 
conditions and actions that caused the event must be accurate. Otherwise, a 
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subsequent intervention may not address the real cause(s)" (Boraiko, 2008). When 
used properly, an incident investigation will identify the chain of events leading up to 
the accident, determine the immediate and root causes, develop correctable solutions, 
provide management oversight, and ensure that reporting requirements are met. An 
underlying concern regarding incident investigations is that they are often perceived 
as a means to place blame on an individual (Hilden, 1996). However, "a thorough 
investigation will often help: show concern for employees, prevent repeat accidents, 
address liability issues, expose errors in processes, identify and eliminate hazards, 
decrease worker compensation costs, correct unsafe acts and conditions, aid in crisis 
planning, and provide information to make recommendations" . Therefore, 
organizations need to understand that the purpose of conducting an investigation is to 
gather the facts that cause incidents, and not to find fault (Hilden, 1996).  
 Incident analyses serve as effective and valuable tools for solving the 
problems which create incidents. Spear states that "using structured problem-solving 
techniques, safety professionals can define the problem, gather and prioritize related 
data, analyze solutions, and evaluate the benefits and cost-effectiveness of available 
prevention options" (Spear, 2002). 
 A Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is essentially a process that is aimed to identify 
the primary cause(s) that contribute to the occurrence of an incident or problem. It is a 
systematic approach and calls for analytical thinking about interrelated cause-effect 
relationships within a system or process which has failed (Okes, 2008). The primary 
purpose of performing a RCA is to minimize risk by solving problems and 
eliminating causes that contribute to risk (Hughes, 2009). When performing a RCA, it 
is important to keep in mind that when accidents or incidents do occur, they are 
typically complex and multi-causational. Many organizations fail to address the root 
cause because they tend to focus on the presenting problem and not the underlying 
cause. According to Williams, "the only way to avoid jumping to a premature 
conclusion that leads to inadequate corrective actions is by taking time to conduct a 
proper RCA" (Williams, 2008). 
 When a RCA is performed properly it will allow an organization to pinpoint 
the circumstances that increased the risk of an accident or incident from occurring 
(Williams, 2008). Determine who or what was involved in the situation; and prioritize 
9 
 
risk management decisions. A poorly performed RCA makes it unlikely that the right 
solutions will be identified and implemented (Hughes, 2009). Many organizations 
utilize RCAs. However, each RCA used will differ from one organization to the next 
and each scope of a RCA will be specific to a defined problem. In general, a RCA is a 
four step systematic process. The four general steps include: 
I. Defining the problem; 
II. Developing a causal understanding as to why the problem occurred; 
III. Identifying corrective solutions; and 
IV. Implement the best solutions and monitor their effectiveness. 
 
 The first step, defining the problem, is the most important step in the RCA 
process. It is important for the problem to be defined in a clear, concise, and complete 
definition which includes where and when it occurred, its frequency, and severity 
(Hilden, 1996). A clear definition of the problem will reduce the likelihood of 
focusing on what is non-relevant for mitigating the problem. 
 The second step of performing a RCA involves identifying and understanding 
the causes which allowed the problem to occur and the evidence for proving it 
(Hilden, 1997). This step can be supplemented by creating a cause-effect diagram. A 
cause-effect diagram can assist in brainstorming potential causes, and help determine 
solutions. The third step, which is identifying corrective solutions, focuses on 
challenging each cause by generating ideas that will mitigate the problem. All causes 
should be considered and it's important to not overlook causes because they could 
lead to future incidents. Once corrective solutions are identified, evaluate the 
effectiveness of the solutions relative to the cost of the problem and the solution's 
likelihood for success. 
 Lastly, the fourth step of the RCA process deals with implementing the best 
solutions and monitoring their effectiveness. Once the best solutions are found, they 
need to be implemented into the system. It is equally important that the solutions, 
once implemented, do not create new or additional problems. And from a process 
improvement standpoint, the effectiveness of the solutions should be continually 
monitored and measured (Hilden, 1996). 
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 There are couple of incident analysis methods practice by different industries. 
These methods are Root Cause Analysis (TOP-SET), the '5 Why" Method, Tripod 
Beta, Fault Tree and Event Tree. The method is aimed at finding the root causes of the 
event. By solving the problem described in the root causes, the probability of the 
incident reoccurring is lowered. This will prevent the incident from happening again. 
The root cause analysis diagram makes a distinction between three types of causes: 
Immediate Causes, Underlying Causes and Root Causes (Goraya, 2008). 
 Under PSM, each facility utilizing a covered process must develop in-house 
capability to investigate incidents that occur in the facility. In order to accomplish this 
a team should be assembled by the employer and thoroughly trained in the techniques 
of investigation including how to conduct interviews of witnesses, compile needed 
documentation, and write clear reports (Spellman, 1997). When this team investigates 
an incident in a covered process area, it is important to consult employees who were 
in or around the incident area. These employees can provide valuable insight into 
what actually occurred during the incident. It is important to point out that the focus 
of the investigation must be to obtain facts and not to place blame. The investigative 
process should clearly deal with all involved individuals in a fair, open, and consistent 
manner (OSHA, 2000). Each incident should be investigated as soon as possible; 
normally within 48 hours. The investigation team should submit a written report to the 
appropriate authority (Moran, 1996). 
The Tripod Beta uses investigation facts to construct a tree diagram known as 
Tripod Beta Tree Diagram. It is a model describing the hazard management aspects of 
the incident. The classification and linkage of tree element represent cause-effect 
logic of the tree diagram. The tree reflects three phases in a incident investigation 
which are (PTS, 2006): 
1. The core model of a Tripod Beta tree defines incident mechanism which is 
represented by 3 main elements: Hazards, Objects and Events. Hazards 
represent a situation that poses a threat to life, property or environment. 
Object can be classify as worker, contractors, equipment & environment. 
Events is the outcome of the combination of Hazard and Object which 




2. Failed or missing hazard management measures (control and defenses) 
such as machine guarding, control devices and Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE), are added to the core model in tree building process. 
3. The final phase of Tripod Beta Analysis tree building is to plot a Tripod 
causal paths for each failed or missing hazard management measures, 
leading from immediate failures to underlying causes. 
The structure of Tripod Beta tree defines scope of investigation. It verifies the 
relevance of the findings of an incident investigation. The model develop which is the 
tree help investigation team to uncover the latent failure (root cause) of an incident. 
The core diagram of a Beta Tripod model is shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
Figure 1: Core Diagram Element 
  
Building The Core Diagram 
 Core diagram starts with an incident event. The hazard and object are placed 
to the left of the event and joined by an "and" connection as shown in figure 2 below. 
 
Tripod Beta Analysis 
Core Diagram 
Hazard 




ex: People, Assest, 
Environment. 
Event 
ex: hydrocarbon gas 





Figure 2: Event occurred through combination "and" of hazard & object 
 
Before an incident event occur, a prior event that leads up to it occur first. When the 
hazard or object was the outcome of the "Prior Event", another hazard and object 
combination needs to be included in the scope of investigation. If, for example, the 
main event is fire damage to equipment, the event causing the hazard (fire) needs to 
be accounted for. The core diagram would show two hazard - object - event 








If the presence of the flammable material was itself caused by another event (ex. a 

























It should be noted that a fire can be considered as both hazard and event. In the Tripod 
Beta model, it is represented by a combined "event-hazard" node. Similarly, if an 
event creating an object is represented by a combined "event-object" nodes. All 
hazards and object should be examined for possible prior events. If no prior events 
take place, the hazard and object end node represent a logical limit to the investigation 
scope. If a prior event is added to an incident investigation due to the evident of its 



















From this sequence of incident analysis tree, we can see that the burn victim becomes 
an "object" for ineffective aftercare (not given proper fire treatment after incident). 
Construction of the core diagram is essential for a successful root causes analysis to 































Figure 4: Damage and injury resulting from a fire incident. Prior, main and 
subsequent event sequence.   
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the scope of the investigation, the hazard, object and event "end nodes" indicating 
points where no further investigation is considered necessary. 
 
Controls / Defenses 
 When incident occur, the trigger event is the last control or defenses to fail. In 
most cases, a control or defense present had failed to protect the object from hazard. 
The investigation needs to identify all failures so that they can be addressed. The Core 
Diagram defines the chain of events, where hazard management measures must have 
been ineffective to protect the system from hazards. To complete the model of WHAT 
happened it is necessary to establish what measures were in place but failed, and what 
should have been in place. This requires a detail examination of the operation, 
including design aspects. In this research, measures addressing hazards are called 
"controls" and measures addressing objects are called "defenses" which can be 














Knowing WHAT happened is only part of the investigation. Effective 
recommendations to avoid similar incident requires WHY the failures occurred. 
Tripod Causation Paths 
 Tripod theory is based on relating accidents to multiple causes. Active failures 






Figure 5: Failed control and defense contributes to event   
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preconditions. These factors originates from failure elsewhere in the process 
industries which is called latent failures. Latent failures come from decision or action 
taken by planner, designer or managers in location from the front line of operations, 
where most accidents occur. Other model or concept (such as fault tree, 5 WHY 
Method) also uses this accident causation theories to identify the 'immediate and 
underlying causes' as accident elements. The Tripod used in this research shows that 
latent failures can actually encourage active failures as well as increase it 





Once incident investigation report data is received from a selected process industries, 
a case study will be conducted in order to validate whether the model help assist in 
identifying the root cause of an incident. The case study will uses the method discuss 
above in order to identify the sequence of event that leads to incident. From there, 
underlying causes (root cause) of an incident can be identify thus prompting an 
effective and more improved corrective actions which helps in preventing recurrence 
of past incident. An example of a Tripod Beta Tree Diagram case study is as shown 
below where the accident report is on permanent disable injury for a worker involving 





















3.1 Research Methodology 
 The intention of this project is to provide process industries an opportunity to 
improve the current method and procedures of investigating and analyzing incidents. 
This opportunity could results in deeper and more comprehensive investigation and a 
clearer understanding of the failure that must be addressed in order to make 
significant and lasting improvements in accident prevention. By identifying the root 
cause of an incident, we can effectively eliminate the possibility of its recurrence. 
This chapter discusses the primary methods employed to conduct this research. The 
flowchart of the overall research methodology in FYP I & II is shown in Figure 7. 
Based on the OSHA PSM Incident Investigation standards, a framework was 
developed which shows integration between each of the standards and the Beta Tripod 
model used in the root cause analysis to ensure that compliance with the standard is 
achieved. From incident investigation, a root cause analysis was performed in order to 
identify and understand the reason why the problem occur, and provide solution and 
recommendation using Tripod Beta model which is shown in Figure 8. Case study 
will be conducted using the developed models to validate the effectiveness of the 
concept. The structured model will guide process industries to systematically identify 
the root cause of an incident, find solutions related to it and eliminate the possibility 
of its recurrence in the future and at the same time comply with OSHA PSM 
regulation. Therefore industries can effectively prevent and eliminate major accidents 






































OSHA PSM CFR 1910.119 (m) - Incident Investigation 
1910.119(m)(1) - Conduct investigation 
1910.119(m)(2) - Conduct investigation within 48 hours.  
1910.119(m)(3) - Investigation team consist of 
knowledgeable person about the process, and person with 
experience conducting investigation.  
 
 
1910.119(m)(4) - Incident Report shall include: 
1. Date of incident 2. Date of investigation  
3. Description of incident. 4. FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO 
INCIDENT 5. Recommendation resulting from investigation 
FROM FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO INCIDENT 
Perform ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS (RCA) to identify the underlying 
cause of incident using TRIPOD BETA ANALYSIS MODEL. 
Is model effective 
in identifying the 
root cause of an 
incident? 
1910.119(m)(5) - Develop solutions & 
recommendation  
1910.119(m)(6)- To prevent recurrence, Implementation 
and monitoring of effectiveness of solution must be 
performed, and shared with all worker relevant to the tasks. 




Figure 7: Framework of OSHA PSM Incident Investigation System 
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 Incident Happen, Assemble 
Investigation Team 
Construct core diagram of incident 
mechanism (Hazard, Object & 
Event) 
Discuss core diagram with 
investigation team. Specify the Hazard 
& Object which contribute to Event 
Identify the Failed Barrier 
(defense) 
Identify the Precondition, Active 
& Latent Failure behind missing 
Barrier  
Complete the Tripod Beta Tree 
Diagram 
Discuss with Investigation Team to 
resolve any abnormal, irregularity 





Identification of the 




Figure 8: Flowchart of carrying out root cause analysis using Tripod Beta   
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In order to effectively conduct the project, a Gantt chart consisted of two semesters 
duration has been constructed and the milestones of FYP I & II has been established 
as shown in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Gantt chart for Final Year Project I 
    
Milestones of Final Year Project 1: 
 
Table 3: Milestones of the Final Year Project I 
Activities Date 
Topic selection Week 1-2 
Research on topic & Literature Review Week 3-14 
Proposal Defense Week 8 
Establish Framework  Week 4-7 
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Table 4: Gantt chart for Final Year Project II. 
 
 
Milestones of Final Year Project II: 
 
Table 5: Milestones of the Final Year Project II. 
Activities Date 
Model Development Week 1-7 
Case study on model developed in process industries Week 6-14 
Report Writing Week 10-14 
       
 
Tools 
The main tools used are Microsoft Office (Word, Excel & Access) which is used to construct the Tripod Beta Tree Diagram 





The planned schedule for Final Year Project I and Final Year Project II are as follows. 
 
Table 6: Project schedule for Final Year Project I 
Title selection Week 1 
Extended proposal Week 6 
Proposal defense and progress 
evaluation 
Week 9 
Draft report Week 13 
Final report Week 14 
 
Table 7: Project schedule for Final Year Project II 
Pre-SEDEX Week 8 
Draft report Week 13 
Final report Week 14 











RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Case Study 1 
The case study is based on a real incident investigation report retrieved from Terengganu 
Crude Oil Terminal (TCOT) PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCSB) through 
collaboration with the company during previous internship program. The host company 
has given permission to the author in using one of its incident investigation full report as 
a guidance in order to develop the Tripod Beta model. The case study is based on actual 
accident case in TCOT PCSB on 17 September 2004. A LP Hydrogen Compressor K-
31201 was manually stopped after high vibration alarm V1801 had triggered, causing 
abnormal noise and vapor cloud was released. The failure was in cylinder 1 of the first 
stage inside the compressor.  Assessment on the failed compressor had showed that it was 
catastrophic failure. Cylinder 1 components i.e. piston rod assembly and cross-head were 
broken/severely damaged. The compressor was anticipated to be out of service for few 
months due to its major component cross-head was broken and unfortunately no spare 
component was kept. Delivery of new item is 10 - 12 weeks. Cost to repair was 
approximated at RM 700k. Concern by the Management is that this incident is 
categorized as Safety Near Miss, Loss of containment and Release/Impact to the 
Environment. However as long as the other compressors K-31201 B & C are running fine 
and in healthy condition, no Production Loss is expected. (This is the 3
rd
 time the same 
problem occurred. Previously the findings of the investigation report suggest it is due to 
fatigue caused by process upset which resulted in piston overload). First failure: March 
2000 cylinder 3. Second failure: Jun 2000 cylinder 3).  
The damaged or failed items are primarily on 1st stage cylinder (cylinder 1) which 
are: 
i. Piston half's, rod, nut and collars 
ii. Crosshead assembly 
iii. Partition packing case 
iv. Oil wiper packing case & stuffer plate 
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v. Connecting rod bearings 
 
The core diagram focuses on what happened. If there is evidence at this stage of why 
any of the events happened it should be ignored for the time being. It should be placed in 
the Fact List for later use. The diagram can be built from any event in the incident 
sequence. The usual place to start is the main event, why the incident is being 
investigated. The vapor cloud released and severe damage to equipment (compressor) is a 
rational start point in this case. 
  
The initial Hazard, Object and Event (HOE) trio is straight forward; the event is the 
vapor cloud released and damaged to equipment, the object is the component of the 
compressor which is cylinder 1 piston rod & cross head, the hazard is the piston hub 
fracture, and crosshead bending.  
  
Figure 9: HOE Prime Event Diagram 
 
Now examine each of the three 'nodes' in turn to determine whether there were prior or 
subsequent elements that need to be accounted for. The piston hub fracture and crosshead 
bending is an Event-Object and the subsequent event is as shown in figure below: 
 
Vapor cloud released & 
Damaged to compressor 
piston hub fracture, 
crosshead bending 





Figure 10: Subsequent event from Piston Hub event 
 
In this sequence of event, the piston hub fracture and crosshead bending is due to the 
high metal to metal impact from operation which causes fatigue cracking  on hub 
undercut radius and propagated to the ribbed area crosshead. From this event, it was 
found out that the high metal to metal impact is caused by deviation of the process mode. 
The deviation causes a failed in material due to the fact that the crosshead was casted, 
designed to sustain tension and compression load as it is subjected to under normal 
operating condition. it would not stand bending or shearing load. Inspection of the failed 
crosshead indicated that it failed under bending and/or shearing load. This event lead to 
the metal-to-metal high impact as a Hazard-Object event which has primary causes that 
leads to its occurrence. The event can be explain in figure below: 
piston hub fracture, 
crosshead bending 
High metal to metal 
impact from operation 





Figure 11: Subsequent event from Material Failed event. 
 
Further investigation shows that the material failed is caused by 3 basic causes, which 
is the root cause of this incident. The active causes (immediate cause leading to the 
problem) is the piston nut was not tightened to the required torque value (which is 
tightened to 30
 o
 instead of 63
o
). By not tightening to the correct torque it created gaps 
between associated mating parts. Cyclic impact load by collar/rod shoulder on hub faces 
under normal load led to fatigue cracking. Multiple cracks were initiated from piston bore 
inner radius and traveled radially to the cast ribs. The Pre-condition that lead to the event 
is the operator never experienced such failure before during his 3 years of working. The 
latent causes (deficiency in management system promoting condition for active causes) 
was thought to be the supervisor that instructed the operator to tightened the piston nut to 
30° torque value had neglected the steps in Manual Instruction Procedure to tightened it 


















Case Study 2 
The second case study is about Jet-A1 particulates causing frequent filter change-out at 
KAFS (KLIA Fueling System Sdn Bhd). Based on the report, it stated that KAFS lodged 
a complaint to PP(M)SB on Jet-A1 suspected to contain unidentified fine particles, 
causing KAFS Microfilters to clog frequently. The complaint was supported by Millipore 
tests conducted by KAFS between October 2000 to April 2001. From the outcome of the 
incident investigation, the root causes, active cause, pre-condition and latent cause, are 
Insufficient push for review of maintenance strategy, never experienced such failure 
before and insufficient knowledge on clay change out procedure respectively. (Complain 
based on microfilter clog quicker than normal life, between October 2000-April 2001)  
The steps in performing the root cause analysis is the same as the first case study. The 
overall Tripod Beta can be presented as shown in Figure 13 below: 
 
Figure 13: Tripod beta diagram of frequent filter changeout causes. 
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Once the tripod beta diagram is constructed, it will be stored inside company 
management system files for future reference and for distribution among company 
worker, and to those involved / responsible to ensure that corrective action are performed 
in a timely manner in order to prevent similar incident from occurring. After that, 
management needs to conduct inspection / KPI on the corrective action taken in order to 
validate its effectiveness. The system files will be as follows: 
 
Figure 14: Incident Investigation System Files. 
Inside the files will be the findings of Incident Investigation Tripod Beta Root Cause 
Analysis and incident investigation report in Microsoft Word. In order to ensure that the 
incident investigation is performed as per intend in this project, a checklist needs to 
completed so that the company will know that the incident investigation is performed as 
per required in OSHA PSM standards. The system developed makes data storing easier, 
user friendly and easy to be retrieved for future reference to the company. 
 
Figure 15: Checklist of Incident Investigation 
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The lack of incident investigation fact findings and unable to identify the root cause of an 
accident is the main reason why past incident reoccur. A thorough investigation with a 
root cause analysis will result in a deeper, more comprehensive investigation and a 
clearer understanding of the failures such as active and latent failure. This will make the 
incident investigation corrective action implementation more reliable and significant in 
terms of lasting accident prevention. This just shows that a root cause analysis is a 
powerful tool for a company incident investigation to identify the root cause of an 
incident. Lesson learned from incident not properly shared is another factor that 
contributes to repeating of the same accident. A proper incident investigation data sharing 
is important in order to share the findings of incident, thus avoiding the same mistake 















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 Process Safety Management (PSM) is a proactive management and engineering 
approach to protect employees, contractors, and other personnel from the risks associated 
with hazardous chemicals. These hazardous chemicals have the potential for catastrophic 
consequences if not properly controlled. The PSM Standard contains 14 key elements - 
all these elements are critical to safety in hazardous chemical processing. One of the 
element is Incident Investigation. This project focuses on the incident investigation 
element which its sole purpose is to avoid the occurrence and reoccurrence of past 
incident which causes unintended injuries to employees, death and damage to property. 
The incident investigation model developed in this project will help process industries in 
identifying the root cause of an incident, and prompt for corrective action to avoid 
recurrence of the past incident. This help industry to minimize its losses from 
compensation claim, property damage and losses, and also serves as a reference 
precaution measure for other similar processing unit. Data sharing within the company 
and also with other company can contribute to elimination of unwanted injury and losses 
to property. 
 
 As a conclusion, it can be said that this project is able to be completed within the 




Further studies may include performing more case study in process plant to identify the 
validity of the model. It would be interesting to know if the implementation of this model 
proved to be successful for identifying, controlling, and preventing the reoccurrence of 
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Active Failure - An act or occurrence that renders a control or defense ineffective, 
thereby increasing the potential for release or exposure of a hazard or increasing the 
potential harm caused by the release. 
 
Latent Failure - A defect or deficiency in a hazard management system that creates a 
condition promoting unsafe acts or increasing the chance of active failure. 
 
General Failure Type - An element of a system for categorizing latent failures. An 
indicator of an aspect of hazard management where a failure exists, and by implication 
where the remedy lies. 
 
Precondition - A system state that promotes unsafe acts or increases the chance of active 
failure. 
 
Object - The object of harm (injury, damage or loss) caused by a hazard. 
 
Unsafe Act - An action, error or omission that renders a control or defence ineffective: an 
















































Example of Root Cause Analysis Model 
1. Tripod Beta 








3. Fault Tree 
 
 
4. Scat Analysis 
 
 
 
